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GUARDING THE GATE TO THE COURTHOUSE:
HOW TRIAL JUDGES ARE USING THEIR
EVIDENTIARY SCREENING ROLE TO
REMAKE TORT CAUSATION RULES
Lucinda M. Finley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Vigorously exercising their role as evidentiary "gatekeepers"-a
task assigned to them by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. '-federal trial judges in prod-
ucts liability cases have been doing far more than screening proposed
expert testimony to determine admissibility. The Daubert gatekeeper
power has become a potent tool of tort lawmaking. Under the guise
of admissibility determinations, federal judges have been making sig-
nificant substantive legal rules on causation by substantially raising
the threshold of scientific proof plaintiffs need to get their expert cau-
sation testimony admitted, and thus survive summary judgment.
While the decisions purport to be no more than deferential nods to
the criteria of science, judges have actually been making legal rules
about what types and strengths of scientific evidence are necessary in
order to prove causation. The emerging legal rule is that plaintiffs'
experts must be able to base their opinions about causation on epide-
miological studies, and that these studies standing alone must show
that the population-wide risk of developing the disease in question, if
exposed to defendants' products, is at least double the risk without
exposure.
In the process of developing this legal rule, judges in products liabil-
ity cases have been making profoundly normative judgments about
the social allocation of risk and who should bear the burden of scien-
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. I would like to thank the other
presenters and participants in the Clifford Symposium for their encouragement and very helpful
comments on this paper, particularly Michael Green, Richard Wright, Marshall Shapo, Gary
Schwartz, and Terrence Kiely. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. John DeFazio for taking time
out of his busy medical practice to read a draft and give me the insights of a clinician who must
often make causal diagnostic judgments based on less than absolute scientific certainty, and to
Neil Buchanan for many provocative conversations about the illusory scientific nature of statisti-
cal significance.
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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tific uncertainty or controversy-injured people or manufacturers of
the products alleged to have caused those injuries? Few of the opin-
ions announcing or applying this emerging causal proof standard ac-
knowledge awareness of the normative nature or implications of their
decisions. Thus, an important underlying policy debate remains sub-
merged. Should the rules of the tort system put the onus for uncer-
tainty about the risks of a product on the manufacturer who has
marketed it, perhaps without sufficient testing or warning? By doing
so, causation rules would enhance the tort policies of deterring mar-
keting of relatively untested products and promoting expanded re-
search on both the effectiveness and hazards of drugs and medical
devices. The tort system would also align itself more with the public
health protective values that govern the FDA regulatory arena, where
a drug is presumed not safe for marketing unless the manufacturer can
prove its safety. 2 Or, should the tort system instead embrace the con-
servative values of the scientific discipline of epidemiology, whose in-
ternal disciplinary standards start with a hypothesis of lack of risk, and
demand stringent statistical proof of a doubling or tripling of the risk
of a disease before entertaining the possibility of a causal associa-
tion?3 Judges have been using their evidentiary gatekeeper power to
squarely align tort law with the conservative causal normative princi-
ples of epidemiology, thus moving the law sharply away from the
more consumer protective social policies about risk embodied in the
safety regulatory system.
While adopting substantive changes in causation law through the
rubric of evidentiary admissibility decisions, judges have also fre-
quently conflated admissibility decisions and sufficiency of evidence
decisions. This has effected another profound but concealed change
in tort law. Judges have applied Daubert to subject each item of ex-
pert proof proffered by plaintiffs to substantive causation law scrutiny,
to see if it, standing alone, would prove both general and specific cau-
2. See, e.g., David A. Kessler, The Basis of the FDA's Decision on Breast Implants, 326 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1713 (1992). In explaining the FDA's decision to limit the use of silicone gel breast
implants to controlled clinical trials, former FDA Commissioner David Kessler explained that
"[c]aveat emptor has never been.., the philosophy at the FDA." Id. at 1715. He noted that the
law governing FDA approval of drugs and medical devices "requires a positive demonstration of
safety - and the burden of proof rests squarely with the manufacturer." Id. at 1713.
3. For an explanation of basic epidemiological precepts, including the degrees of increased
risk ratio that epidemiologists prefer to see before they will suggest the possibility of a causal
association, see Melissa Moore Thompson, Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for
Toxic Tort Litigation, 71 N.C. L. REV. 247, 249-54 (1992). For a discussion of the values that
underlie epidemiology and their differences from the values and goals of the legal system, see
Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology and Legal
Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183 (1994).
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sation. If the scientific studies underlying an expert's opinion are not
alone sufficient, then the expert's testimony is deemed inadmissible. 4
This stands in stark contrast to traditional and proper practice, which
sees the admissibility of evidence as a question quite distinct from the
sufficiency of evidence to meet a plaintiff's burden of proof. The suffi-
ciency inquiry is supposed to view plaintiffs' evidence in its entirety to
see if, taken as a whole, it would support a conclusion that causation is
more likely than not.5 By calling what is really a sufficiency of the
evidence determination an admissibility decision, judges are using
their evidentiary gatekeeper power to close the gate on plaintiffs'
opportunities to have their proof evaluated as a cumulative whole.
This subtly but substantially increases plaintiffs' burden of proving in-
dividual causation, and it also furthers the trend in toxic tort cases to
shift the allocation of power away from juries to judges.6 Because a
trial judge's decision to exclude evidence is reviewed under the lenient
abuse of discretion standard of review, 7 this new heightened substan-
tive standard of causation and judges' applications of it are largely
insulated from meaningful appellate review.
This article explores these substantive causation law implications,
and the consequent social policy import, of the way federal trial judges
in products liability cases have exercised their Daubert evidentiary
gatekeeper role. First, the article will briefly describe the recent im-
portant Supreme Court trilogy of products liability evidence decisions:
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,8 General Electric Co. v.
Joiner,9 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.10 It will then examine
how trial judges have used these decisions, despite Daubert's an-
nounced intention to liberalize decisions on admitting scientific expert
causation testimony, to erect conservative, and in some instances, vir-
tually insurmountable barriers to plaintiffs' ability to prove causation.
These barriers stem from substantive legal decisions about causation
law, rather than from scientific principles or case by case assessments
4. See infra text accompanying notes 25-33 (discussing cases that take this step of turning
admissibility decisions into sufficiency of the evidence rulings).
5. The blurring of the line between the admissibility of evidence and the sufficiency of that
evidence to prove causation is explored in the context of cases dealing with whether the morning
sickness drug Bendectin caused birth defects. See JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A
STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 155-56 (1998); Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is
There a Rational Solution to the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 192-94 (1992).
6. See SANDERS, supra note 5, at 185-93 (discussing the trend in Bendectin cases to shift deci-
sional power away from juries to judges).
7. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997).
8. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
9. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
10. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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of proffered testimony. Finally, the article analyzes some of the socie-
tal implications of these legal developments, including differential im-
pact on social groups whose health problems have tended to be
ignored or underexplored by the scientific research community; a di-
minished ability of the tort system to stimulate scientific research and
knowledge; and a premature sense of scientific closure from the legal
declaration of the supposedly definitive state of science, which can
shut down further research on scientific issues that are still uncertain
or contested.
II. THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY EVIDENCE TRILOGY
Daubert emerged from Bendectin litigation, which was a significant
source of the controversy over whether courts were admitting "junk
science," the epithet that critics of the tort system placed on expert
opinions they regarded as not well-founded in scientific methodology
or departures from the mainstream of scientific opinion." When
Bendectin was initially marketed to prevent or reduce morning sick-
ness in pregnant women, the pharmaceutical company had done little
research into potential adverse effects, including the potential to pro-
duce birth defects. 12 Several women who took Bendectin and then
bore children with deformed limbs filed suit on behalf of their dam-
aged children, claiming that the drug was the cause of the birth de-
fects. When some of these initial Bendectin cases went to trial, juries
were disturbed by the paucity of safety research conducted by the
manufacturer, and by the company's efforts to ignore or misrepresent
warning signs in animal studies. The ensuing plaintiffs' verdicts stimu-
lated an exponential growth in Bendectin litigation. 13
The burgeoning litigation and accompanying media attention
helped to push the issue of Bendectin's teratogenicity onto the scien-
tific community's research agenda. Numerous epidemiological stud-
ies, some with the financial support of the drug company, were
conducted, and the published results indicated that taking Bendectin
11. The term was coined by Peter Huber in PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCI-
ENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991). For a thorough dissection of Huber's work as nonscholarly
and based on inaccurate, or largely unsupported or overblown anecdotes, see Kenneth J. Chese-
bro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993). See also
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 210, n.29
(1999) (describing Huber's book as a myopic attack on plaintiffs' experts).
12. For a history of Bendectin, its testing, marketing, and the subsequent litigation, see
MICHAEL GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS ToxIc SUB-
STANCES LITIGATION (1996); SANDERS, supra note 5.
13. In his book on the Bendectin litigation, Joseph Sanders provides important insights into
why the strong evidence of manufacturer misconduct swayed juries to downplay or disregard
uncertain, weak or negative evidence on casuation. See SANDERS, supra note 5, at 12-13, 130-34.
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during pregnancy did not appreciably increase the risk of bearing a
child with birth defects.14 Despite this mounting scientific evidence
tending to exonerate the drug, plaintiffs produced experts who con-
ducted, for purposes of the litigation, reanalyses of the existing stud-
ies. These reanalyses critiqued some of the defense oriented studies
for including in the group of women deemed exposed to Bendectin
those who did not take the drug until after the crucial time of fetal
limb formation. These reanalyses, not surprisingly, did show that
Bendectin more than doubled the risk of birth defect development. 15
When presented with plaintiffs' reanalyses of the epidemiology, and
with animal study data and experts comparing the chemical structure
of Bendectin to that of known teratogens, some juries still returned
verdicts in favor of plaintiffs, despite the growing body of contrary
epidemiology. These verdicts were regarded as aberrational by many
members of the scientific community, the defense bar, some trial
judges, and virtually all appellate courts reviewing Bendectin cases. A
judicial consensus emerged to parallel the scientific consensus that
Bendectin had not been proven to be a teratogen. In response to this
scientific consensus, judges employed the technique of judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, 16 or ruled that plaintiffs lacked sufficient
evidence to satisfy the burden of proof,17 to gradually adopt a legal
rule that unless plaintiffs could produce a consistent body of statisti-
cally significant epidemiological studies that showed that Bendectin at
least doubled the risk of birth defects, plaintiffs did not have sufficient
evidence of causation to support a verdict.
Other courts faced with Bendectin cases adopted similar reasoning
about the essential threshold of scientific proof, but instead of sup-
planting a jury verdict, they deemed inadmissible the opinion of any
plaintiff's expert who attempted to draw a causal inference based on
anything other than statistically significant, peer reviewed, published
epidemiological studies that showed a relative risk above the back-
ground risk level of two or greater.' 8 In Daubert, the Ninth Circuit
held that plaintiffs' expert testimony on causation was inadmissible
14. For a thorough discussion of the epidemiological studies on Bendectin, see id. at 61-86;
GREEN, supra note 12, at 26-34; see also Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testi-
mony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1993).
15. For a discussion of the methodological, selection bias, and other confounding errors of
these reanalyses by plaintiffs' experts, see SANDERS, supra note 5, at 181-83.
16. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986).
17. See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989).
18. See Lynch v. Merrell Nat'l Labs., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); Ealy v. Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
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because it did not meet this legal and scientific threshold. The court
invoked the venerable ruling in Frye v. United States,19 a 1923 case
about the admissibility of polygraph evidence. Frye required that in
order to be admissible, a scientific opinion must be "generally ac-
cepted" within the scientific community, and that peer review and
publication were inviolate requirements of general acceptance. Opin-
ions that were contrary to the weight of a growing body of scientific
studies also could not, by definition, satisfy the "general acceptance"
standard.20
Complaining that the Frye "general acceptance" rule was outdated,
had been superseded by the more liberal Federal Rules of Evidence,
and unfairly operated to exclude the scientifically valid, but novel or
controversial opinion, the plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court to
review the Ninth Circuit decision. Limited to this narrow issue of
whether Frye was consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Court granted certiorari, and reversed, holding that the ostensibly
more liberal standards of Federal Rule 702 governed the admissibility
of scientific expert testimony. 21
The Court first emphasized that under Rule 104(a), the federal trial
judge has an obligation to serve as a "gatekeeper" to screen evidence
and admit only scientific opinion testimony that comports with Rule
702. This aspect of the ruling rejected the "just check credentials and
let it all in" attitude that some judges and commentators had previ-
ously adopted towards expert testimony. 22 Rule 702 speaks of "scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" that will assist the
trier of fact. Thus, the Court held, "the subject of an expert's testi-
mony must be 'scientific knowledge' "-it must be grounded in the
methods and procedures of science. 23 The evidentiary reliability of
expert testimony turns on whether it meets the criteria of "scientific
knowledge," which is judged according to its "scientific validity. ' 24
Justice Blackmun's opinion then attempted to provide some factors
to help trial judges assess scientific validity: 1) scientific knowledge is
"falsifiable"-it can be and has been tested to see if the results can be
replicated or disproven; 2) scrutiny of the scientific community
through peer review or publication is a factor bearing on validity, but
it is not the sine qua non as it is under Frye; 3) the court should con-
19. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
20. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
21. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
22. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (example of "let it
all in" attitude).
23. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90.
24. Id. at 590 n.9.
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sider the known or potential error rates of the scientific technique or
method; and 4) general acceptance within the relevant scientific com-
munity is a permissible, but not determinative, factor.25 The Court
stressed that this assessment of validity under Rule 702 was meant to
be flexible, and cautioned that judges should focus on the principles
and methodology, not on the conclusions drawn from scientifically
valid methodology.26 Finally, using the general Rule 402 admissibility
criterion of relevance, the Court admonished that scientific expert
opinion testimony must "bear a valid scientific connection to the per-
tinent inquiry. '27
Because Daubert rejected the Frye test's required deference to sci-
entific conventional wisdom, and stressed the liberality and flexibility
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, some hailed it as a pro-plaintiff de-
cision that would make it easier for toxic tort and products liability
claimants to prove causation.28 Others predicted that because the de-
cision required trial judges closely to scrutinize the bases for scientific
opinion, and to defer to the standards of the scientific community, it
would lead to more widespread exclusion of plaintiffs' proposed ex-
perts, particularly where plaintiffs were pushing new or still controver-
sial scientific theories of causation.29
Those who predicted that trial judges would flex their gatekeeper
muscles to exclude vast quantities of plaintiffs' proposed expert causa-
tion opinion testimony in products liability cases have turned out to be
right. The post-Daubert era can fairly be described as the period of
"strict scrutiny" of science by non-scientifically trained judges. Judges
now routinely assess the reliability of scientific studies by scrutinizing
the criticisms leveled at the methodology of particular studies. What
few predicted, however, is the way Daubert has been expanded well
25. Id. at 593-94.
26. Id. at 594-95.
27. Id. at 592.
28. For example, the Cardozo Law Review sponsored a symposium on Daubert, with academ-
ics and practitioners as participants. The opinions at this symposium were closely divided be-
tween those who thought that Daubert would prove to be a boon to plaintiffs, and those who
opined that in application, it would favor defendants. For examples of those who hailed it as a
pro-plaintiff ruling, see, for example, Anthony Z. Roisman, Conflict Resolution in the Courts:
The Role of Science, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1945 (1994); Kenneth Chesebro, Taking Daubert's
"Focus" Seriously: The Methodology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1994).
29. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v.
Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139 (1994); Bert Black, The Supreme
Court's View of Science: Has Daubert Exercised the Certainty Demon?, 15 CARDOZO L. REv.
2129 (1994); Clifton T. Hutchinson & Danny S. Ashby, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.: Redefining the Bases for Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony, 15 CARDozo L. REV.
1875 (1994); Marc S. Klein, After Daubert: Going Forward With Lessons from the Past, 15 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 2219 (1994).
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beyond its Bendectin context to usher in heightened substantive rules
of causation. The remaining two cases in the expert admissibility tril-
ogy have facilitated this trend towards making substantive causation
law in the guise of evidentiary admissibility determinations.
Shortly after the Daubert decision, some judges began to question,
or chip away at the Court's caution that admissibility determinations
were to be made on the basis of the scientific validity of methodology,
and not the conclusions. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit became the most forceful proponent for the view that
methodology and conclusions are not so distinct as the Court seemed
to indicate in Daubert. In the ongoing Paoli Railroad Yard Litigation,
the court reasoned that to exercise their role as gatekeepers, judges
must not only determine if the underlying methodology on which an
expert relies is scientifically valid, but must also evaluate whether the
conclusion drawn from the methodology is scientifically supportable. 30
This growing tendency of trial judges to throw out expert testimony
because the conclusions were deemed questionable-often because
controversial or not "generally accepted"-prompted some federal
appellate courts to insist on maintaining the distinction between the
admissibility of evidence and the weight to be given to it by the trier
of fact. 31
The Eleventh Circuit was one of the courts that took district judges
to task for scrutinizing an expert's conclusions while passing on the
admissibility of the opinion.32 This prompted the next case to go to
the Supreme Court, General Electric v. Joiner.33 In a case alleging that
plaintiff developed cancer from occupational exposure to PCBs, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's decision to exclude plain-
tiff's expert testimony on causation. The court ruled that because the
Federal Rules displayed a liberal preference for admissibility, and the
judge had treaded too far into evaluating conclusions and thus
usurped the jury's function to weigh the competing expert conclu-
sions, appellate courts should apply a "stringent standard of review"
to decisions to exclude evidence.
30. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745-46 (3d Cir. 1994).
31. The two circuits that have been most concerned with limiting admissibility decisions used
by scientific experts, and not allowing the decision whether to admit evidence to blur into an
assessment of its weight or the soundness of the conclusions drawn from a body of scientific
evidence, are the District of Columbia and Second Circuits. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist.
Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995); Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 141 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
32. See Joiner v. General Elec., 78 F.3d 524, 529-30 (11th Cir. 1996).
33. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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Joiner was an electrician who had long experienced occupational
exposure to a PCB contaminated coolant fluid. When he contracted
small cell lung cancer, he sued the manufacturer of PCBs, and the
manufacturer of the transformers and coolant he had worked with,
contending that his exposure to PCBs promoted his cancer. To prove
causation, Joiner's experts relied on animal studies showing that PCBs
injected into mice caused cancer, and on epidemiological studies of
groups of workers exposed to PCBs who developed higher than ex-
pected rates of cancer. The district court picked apart these studies,
despite the fact that all were concededly based on scientifically valid
methodologies. The animals were infant mice, not adults; the dose
they were given far exceeded the maximum PCB dose that Joiner was
ever exposed to; the type of cancer the mice developed was different
than the type afflicting Joiner. One epidemiologic study showing a
heightened incidence of lung cancer in PCB production workers was
not statistically significant; another did not rule out toxins other than
PCBs to which the workers had also been exposed. For all these rea-
sons, the district court ruled, any conclusions drawn by Joiner's ex-
perts that these studies could support a finding that PCBs could cause
lung cancer in humans were not supportable. 34
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's holding that de-
cisions to exclude expert evidence must be reviewed under a stringent
standard. Instead, the Court held, like any other evidentiary decision,
trial judges' decisions to exclude scientific expert testimony under
Daubert should be assessed under the lenient "abuse of discretion"
standard of review. But the Court did not stop there; it went on to
substantially undermine the line between methodology and conclu-
sions it had drawn in Daubert. Endorsing the view propounded by the
Third Circuit, and rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's determination that
it is legal error to reject expert testimony because the trial judge dis-
agrees with the conclusions an expert draws from the data, the Court
stated:
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one
another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.
But nothing in Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to ex-
isting data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may con-
clude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the
data and the opinion proferred. [citations omitted] That is what the
34. For a discussion of the district court's reasons for rejecting the studies relied on by plain-
tiff's experts, see id. at 144-46.
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District Court did here, and we hold that it did not abuse its discre-
tion in so doing.35
This aspect of the Joiner majority opinion prompted a partial dis-
sent from Justice Stevens. He argued for continued adherence to
Daubert's bright line between methodology and conclusions, and cau-
tioned that scrutiny of an expert's conclusions at the admissibility
phase usurps the traditional function of the jury to assess the validity
or strength of an expert's conclusions. 36
Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, endorsed the majority view
that in exercising their gatekeeper role, judges must "make subtle and
sophisticated determinations about scientific methodology and its re-
lation to the conclusions an expert witness seeks to offer. . . . 37 The
need for judges to make their own judgments about an expert's con-
clusions, Justice Breyer opined, is especially important "where the sci-
ence itself is tentative or uncertain. '38 This is an open invitation to
trial judges to make normative decisions about how much scientific
controversy or uncertainty the tort system should tolerate when deter-
mining whether to let plaintiffs in products liability suits have an op-
portunity to present their case to a jury. Indeed, Justice Breyer made
his value judgment explicit:
[M]odern life, including good health as well as economic well-being,
depends upon the use of artificial or manufactured substances, such
as chemicals. And it may, therefore, prove particularly important to
see that judges fulfill their Daubert gatekeeping function, so that
they help assure that the powerful engine of tort liability, which can
generate strong financial incentives to reduce, or to eliminate, pro-
duction, points towards the right substances and does not destroy
the wrong ones. 39
The lesson of Joiner is that judges may scrutinize a scientists' con-
clusions, even when doing so requires judges to make "subtle and so-
phisticated" scientific evaluations and to wade into areas of scientific
controversy and uncertainty. Moreover, judges should be particularly
careful about admitting conclusions that are still considered tenuous
or debatable, even when based on scientifically valid methodology,
lest the "engine of tort liability" prematurely condemn a product that
may, upon further scientific study, prove not to be harmful. In this
regard, Joiner risks resuscitating the Frye "general acceptance" test
35. Id.
36. Id. at 154-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 147-48.
39. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 148-49.
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supposedly repudiated in Daubert.40 And, no matter how the judge
rules on a plaintiff's proffered evidence, that decision will be largely
insulated from searching appellate scrutiny, because it is difficult to
conclude that a trial judge has abused her discretion.
For these reasons, Joiner is far more than a mere lesson in the stan-
dard of review to be applied to evidentiary rulings. It expresses a nor-
mative judgment that judges are to be trusted more than juries (and
sometimes more than scientists) in areas where law intersects with sci-
ence. It also urges caution on the tort system, expressing a preference
to wait for the slow attainment of scientific certainty rather than to
make a decision that may be ahead of scientific consensus, which
often then prompts further scientific inquiry. In Justice Breyer's view,
a legal decision that a product is harmful when science is not yet cer-
tain presents greater policy problems than the alternative of allowing
continued marketing and barring the courthouse door to ill people
whose claims of causation may in fact later be widely embraced by the
scientific community.
The final step in the Court's expert testimony trilogy occurred in
March, 1999, when the Court decided Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi-
chael.41 Given the emphasis in Daubert and Joiner on scientific expert
testimony, lower courts had disputed whether trial judges should also
act as gatekeepers to strictly scrutinize the testimony of non-scientific
or technical experts, such an engineers, forensic experts, psychologists,
economists, sociologists, or clinicians. Kumho was a products liability
case stemming from a tire blowout which caused a fatal traffic acci-
dent. The plaintiffs sued the tire's manufacturer and distributor,
claiming the blowout was caused by a defect in the tire that made its
tread separate from the steel-belted tire carcass. Their defect and cau-
sation case relied extensively on the opinion testimony of an expert in
tire failure analysis. When faced with the defendants' challenge to the
admissibility of this expert's opinion, the district court engaged in a
rather rote application of the Daubert factors-peer review and publi-
cation, potential error rate of the methodology, and degree of accept-
ance within the relevant scientific community-to conclude that the
expert's methods and conclusions he drew from his analysis were not
"reliable." The Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision to exclude the
expert's testimony, holding that the Daubert factors were relevant
40. See, e.g., Diaz v. Johnson Matthey Inc., 893 F. Supp. 358, 375 (D.N.J. 1995) (offering the
insight of a federal district court in New Jersey in a pre-Joiner decision: "If conclusive [scientific]
evidence were necessary to admit ... a theory on general causation, we might as well be pro-
ceeding under the Frye general acceptance test .....
41. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
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only to "science," and thus should not be applied to non-scientific,
experience-based observation. 42
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision. First,
it rejected the distinction lower courts had tried to draw between "sci-
entific" and "nonscientific" experts, because, by its terms, Rule 702
applies to all "technical or specialized knowledge." Thus, trial judges
must perform the gatekeeping task of closely scrutinizing all expert
testimony. The Court further concluded that while the specific
Daubert factors may not all apply outside the scientific realm,
Daubert's "general principles" apply. Thus, when an expert's "factual
basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called suffi-
ciently into question ... the trial judge must determine whether the
testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the
relevant discipline. ' 43 By including an expert's application of meth-
ods and principles as among the matters to be assessed, the Court
again signaled its apparent approval of scrutinizing the conclusions an
expert draws from data, studies, or visual inspection. Indeed, the
Court itself painstakingly evaluated the expert's conclusions. It did
not question the methodology of visually inspecting tires, but stressed
that the expert's conclusion that the particular tire in question had a
defect was not reliably supported by his visual inspection, given the
presence of known wear factors that could counter the defectiveness
conclusion.
The combined implication of this trilogy of Court decisions is that in
all areas of products liability and tort law that rest on any sort of spe-
cialized, scientific, or technical expert testimony, federal trial courts
must exercise a vigorous gatekeeping function to carefully evaluate
the basis and conclusions of plaintiffs' proposed expert testimony,
whether going to the issue of defect, clinical diagnosis or standard of
care in medical malpractice cases,44 or causation in toxic tort cases. In
42. Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997).
43. Id.
44. The Court's decision in Kumho Tire seems to have effectively resolved a brewing contro-
versy in the lower courts over whether clinical medical testimony must be scrutinized under the
Daubert factors. See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (setting
aside a contrary panel decision, and holding that a medical expert's diagnostic opinion, while
highly subjective and not "scientific" in the classic sense of being subject to experimental fal-
sifiability, must nonetheless be scrutinized under the Daubert gatekeeping factors). While
Moore involved a clinical diagnostic and causation opinion, the gatekeeping role could also be
applied to standard of care expert testimony in medical malpractice cases, including whether the
defendant health care providers conform to or deviate from standard medical judgment or prac-
tice. In recognition of the fact that clinical medical testimony often is based on experience and
observation of the plaintiff and similar cases, and on what is known as "differential diagnosis"-
ruling out other possible causes-many courts have not required clinical causation experts to
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exercising this gatekeeping role, courts may evaluate the expert's con-
clusions as well as the methodology, and, no matter how outcome de-
terminative the evidentiary rulings, or no matter how much they really
rest on substantive legal decisions, district judge's decisions may only
be reviewed for abuse of discretion, 45 rather than reviewed de novo,
as the substantive legal rulings they really often are.
The next section explores how this evidentiary trilogy-particularly
Daubert and Joiner, because it is still too early to assess the impact of
Kumho Tire-has enabled courts to effect significant substantive legal
changes in the tort law regarding the type and strength of causal proof
that plaintiffs are required to produce.
III. USING THE GATEKEEPING ROLE TO CHANGE THE SUBSTANCE
OF TORT LAW: ELEVATING THE SUBSTANTIVE
REQUIREMENTS FOR PROVING CAUSATION
The Daubert decision stimulated an extensive amount of commen-
tary, including ruminations on the epistemological dilemma of how
judges without scientific training could evaluate the scientific validity
and reliability of evidence, and whether in trying to do so, judges
would be making scientific determinations or legal rulings.46 A review
of post-Daubert cases reveals that many judges have resolved this ap-
parent epistemological conundrum by making what are plainly legal
rulings about the type and nature of scientific evidence plaintiffs must
produce to even attempt to prove causation. Some judges have used
their gatekeeper power to wade into disputed scientific territory to try
to resolve or choose sides in scientific controversies. Ignoring the
support their opinions with epidemiological studies. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161
F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1998); Zuchowitz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998); McCullock v.
H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995).
45. Some appellate courts are still trying to perform meaningful appellate review, and to hew
to the traditional line that in making admissibility decisions, district courts are not to evaluate
the weight to be given to competing expert claims. Meaningful appellate review is procedurally
more possible when a trial judge decides that a plaintiff's expert causation testimony is insuffi-
cient to raise a jury issue, and thus grants summary judgment to the defendant, or judgment as a
matter of law setting aside a jury verdict. The standard of review for summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law is de novo, not the relatively cursory abuse of discretion standard.
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1998). In Kennedy, the court re-
versed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment in rejecting plaintiffs' expert causation testi-
mony. The Ninth Circuit held that trial judges "should not exclude expert testimony simply
because they disagree with the conclusions of the expert." Id. at 1230. See also In re Joint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing trial judge's grant of judgment
notwithstanding the verdict to defendant, and finding that trial judge had rejected plaintiffs'
expert causation testimony because of disagreement with expert's conclusions).
46. See, e.g., Alexander Capron, Daubert and the Quest for Value-Free "Scientific Knowledge"
in the Courtroom, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 85 (1996); Farrell, supra note 3, at 2183.
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usual legal rule that decisions about the admissibility of evidence are
meant to be distinct from decisions about the weight or sufficiency of
evidence, these courts have adopted the legal position that there is no
difference under Daubert-Joiner between the sufficiency and admissi-
bility determinations. 47 Other judges, perhaps wishing to steer clear
of the difficult task of parsing scientific evidence, have instead seized
on familiar legal criteria such as "relevance" to make substantive cau-
sation law rulings with precedential effects well beyond the particular
evidence at issue in the case. Several courts have also avoided the
difficult implications of having to assess the reliability of scientific
methodology by turning the supposedly flexible and advisory Daubert
factors of peer review, publication, and degree of widespread accept-
ance in the scientific community into simplistic legal litmus tests.48
The most noteworthy trend in using admissibility determinations to
make substantive causation rules-noteworthy because it is seriously
scientifically and legally misguided-is a growing number of court rul-
ings stating that in order for an expert opinion about causation to be
relevant and thus admissible, the expert must base her testimony on
epidemiological studies that demonstrate the product in question at
least doubles the risk of the disease from which plaintiff suffers. 49
47. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997); Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183, 189, 192 (Tex. App. 1998). See also In re Joint
E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding plaintiffs' evi-
dence insufficient because the judge found their studies subject to criticism, or found the defense
studies more conclusive or less plagued by criticism). The Second Circuit reversed, holding that
by doing so the judge had impermissibly crossed the boundary between evaluating the suffi-
ciency of evidence and substituting his judgment about its weight or credibility for the jury's. In
re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1137 (2d Cir. 1995). The appellate court also
rejected defendants' argument that Daubert eroded the line between admissibility and suffi-
ciency of the evidence. See id. at 1132-33. This tendency of judges to blur questions of the
sufficiency of evidence and the admissibility of evidence started in the Bendectin cases. Despite
growing epidemiological support for the defendants, some juries continued to return verdicts in
favor of plaintiffs, and judges grew openly skeptical of juries' abilities to correctly evaluate com-
plex science. See Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts after Daubert,
78 MN*,. L. REV. 1387, 1431-33 (1994).
48. Examples of courts simplistically using Daubert factors such as peer review, publication,
and general acceptance include Forsyth v. Eli Lilly Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 541 (D. Haw.
1998), Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App. 1998).
See also Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999), where the court
seemed to do little more than check off as if from a list whether an expert's theories had been
published, peer reviewed, and were generally accepted. Id. at 1313. The court of appeals af-
firmed the decision to exclude the testimony, but for more searching reasons. Id. at 1322. Some
commentators specifically warned that Daubert presented a risk that some judges would grasp at
simplistic formulations as screening devices. See Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary Draw-
ing and the Need for Context-Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1996).
49. Epidemiological studies ascertain a "relative risk" for a certain disease if one is exposed to
a product or toxin. Epidemiologists compare the number of cases of a disease in a sample group
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Courts have used two primary routes to arrive at the legal proof re-
quirement of epidemiology with a relative risk of 2.0 or greater. One
is to use the "reliability" factor from Daubert, which is supposed to
focus on the validity and scientific soundness of the methodology, to
declare any epidemiological study with a lower relative risk "unrelia-
ble" as a matter of law.50 The second common move is to conflate the
admissibility criteria of relevance with burden of proof, to reason that
since a plaintiff's burden of proof is to show that the product to which
she was exposed "more likely than not" caused her disease, and an
epidemiological study that shows a doubling of risk (a relative risk of
2.0 in statistical terms) means that it is 50% likely that any particular
case of the disease is attributable to the exposure rather than unex-
of the unexposed population, known as the "background risk," with the number of cases of the
disease in a sample group of people exposed to the factor being studied. See Linda A. Bailey et
al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTrIFIC EVIDENCE 168 (1994). The resulting ratio is known as the relative risk. Id. A rela-
tive risk of 2.0 means there are twice as many cases of the disease in the exposed group than in
the unexposed group. Id. To put it another way, it means that the increased risk above back-
ground levels faced by the group is 100%. When this group risk is translated to the individual
level, it means that in the case of any person with the disease, it is 50% likely that their illness is
attributable to their exposure. Id. For other excellent explanations of the principles and meth-
ods of epidemiology, including the relative risk concept, see SANDERS, supra note 5, at 47-60;
Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substance Litigation:
The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 647 (1992);
Thompson, supra note 3, at 250.
Courts also require that the risk ratio in a study be "statistically significant," which is a statisti-
cal measurement of the likelihood that any detected association has occurred by chance, or is
due to the exposure. Tests of statistical significance are intended to guard against what are called
"Type I" errors, or falsely ascribing a relationship when there in fact is not one (a false positive).
See SANDERS, supra note 5, at 51. The discipline of epidemiology is inherently conservative in
making causal ascriptions, and regards Type I errors as more serious than Type II errors, or
falsely assuming no association when in fact there is one (false negative). Thus, epidemiology
conventionally requires a 95% level of statistical significance, i.e. that in statistical terms it is
95% likely that the association is due to exposure, rather than to chance. See id. at 50-52;
Thompson, supra note 3, at 256-58. Despite courts' use of statistical significance as an eviden-
tiary screening device, this measurement has nothing to do with causation. It is most reflective
of a study's sample size, the relative rarity of the disease being studied, and the variance in study
populations. Thompson, supra note 3, at 256.
Some judges have improperly blurred the two very distinct concepts of relative risk and statis-
tical significance by labeling the results of epidemiological studies which derived a relative risk
of less than 2.0 as "statistically insignificant." See, e.g., Maiorana v. U.S. Mineral Products Co.,
827 F. Supp. 1014, 1041-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) describing epidemiological studies that yielded rela-
tive risks between 1.0 and 1.5 as "statistically insignificant').
50. See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming
the district court's rejection of epidemiological studies as unreliable because with a relative risk
below 2.0 there cannot be a consensus in the general scientific community that an association
exists). The Allison court also noted that this verged on resurrecting the Frye general acceptance
test, but read Joiner as essentially permitting that resurrection. Id. See also Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183, 199-202 (Tex. App. 1998); Kelley v. American Heyer-
Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 878 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
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plained causes, or "background risk," then only such epidemiological
studies satisfy the burden of proof.51 Causation evidence that does
not satisfy the burden of proof, these courts reason, is not "relevant"
to the issue of causation, and thus can be excluded.52 These courts
also reason that since epidemiology is the only type of science that
studies causal associations in human populations, other types of scien-
tific evidence, such as animal studies, toxicology reports, chemical
structure analysis, and clinical differential diagnosis, even if "scientifi-
cally valid" evidence of the type relied on by scientists to make risk
assessments or diagnostic causal attributions, are not legally relevant
unless also supported by epidemiology with the requisite increase in
relative risk. 53
This development in causation law initially appeared in Judge Wein-
stein's opinion in the Agent Orange litigation,54 and judges presiding
over Bendectin cases picked up on it and increasingly adopted it as a
51. In the eyes of some judges, The Federal Judicial Center's Reference Guide on Epidemiol-
ogy seems to endorse the approach of making admissibility determinations turn on the ultimate
burden of proof, when it informs judges:
The civil burden of proof is described most often as requiring the fact finder to "believe
that what is sought to be proved... is more likely true than not true." The relative risk
from an epidemiological study can be adapted to this 50% plus standard to yield a
probability or likelihood that an agent caused an individual's disease. The threshold for
concluding that an agent was more likely the cause of a disease than not is a relative
risk greater than 2.0.
Reference Guide on Epidemiology, supra note 49, at 168-69. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm.s, Inc.
v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 721-22 (Tex. 1997); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 1998
U.S. Dist. Lexis 15028, at *15 (E.D. Wash. 1998). The Reference Manual, however, was not
making any recommendation about admissibility of evidence or the sufficiency of all plaintiffs'
evidence taken as a whole. Nor was it saying that only epidemiology that reached this threshold
could be relevant to the issue of causation, and neither was it instructing judges that no plaintiff
with other types of scientific proof or with epidemiology with a lower relative risk but other
strong evidence of individual causation could get before a jury. Rather, the Manual was at-
tempting to educate judges about the principles of epidemiology, and illustrate those principles
by equating them to legal concepts with which the judges were familiar. It was not offering
prescriptive legal recommendations about how to rule on the evidence in any particular case.
52. See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999); Schudel v.
General Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d
1311 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15028 (E.D.
Wash. 1998); Sanderson v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981 (C.D. Cal.
1996); In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Colo. 1998); Forsyth v. Eli Lilly Co.,
1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 541 (D. Haw. 1998); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D.
Or. 1996); Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 706.
53. See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1217; Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1387.
54. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
Professor Michael Green provides an extensive discussion of how the Agent Orange litigation
has influenced subsequent legal causation developments. See Green, supra note 49, at 671-74.
For an in-depth story of this seminal toxic tort litigation and the factors that influenced Judge
Weinstein to rule as he did, see PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986). Both Profes-
sors Green and Schuck are highly critical, both from a scientific and legal perspective, of the way
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substantive rule.5 5 For example, on remand from the Supreme Court,
the Ninth Circuit in Daubert reasoned that because the burden of
proof in tort is "more likely than not," only epidemiology that showed
the increase in the relative risk to be 2.0 or greater could meet the
"fit," or relevance prong elucidated by the Supreme Court.56 This
principle of causation law-that to sustain a toxic exposure claim,
plaintiffs must be able to offer statistically significant epidemiology
that demonstrates that the risk of disease is at least doubled upon ex-
posure to the product in question-has now been firmly entrenched in
silicone gel breast implant litigation as well.5 7
The rejection of plaintiffs' expert testimony on causation may be
justified in the context of Bendectin and breast implant litigation, be-
cause during the course of the litigation, the body of epidemiology
grew and matured, and failed to confirm any substantial increase in
risk. This cast plaintiffs' experts in the position of arguing against a
developing scientific consensus and having to admit that their opinion
as to a causal relationship was fraught with uncertainty. The well de-
veloped epidemiological context of these two medical products is a
significant explanatory reason why courts increasingly came to reject
admitting plaintiffs' expert testimony.58
in which Judge Weinstein elevated epidemiology to make it foundational to a plaintiffs' causa-
tion case. See SCHUCK, supra; Green, supra.
55. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995); Brock v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989).
56. 43 F.3d at 1320-22.
57. See, e.g., Allison, 184 F.3d at 1300; In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1217;
Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tex. 1997); Hall, 947 F. Supp.
at 1387; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App. 1998). Contrary
opinions in breast implant litigation, rejecting epidemiology with a relative risk of greater than
2.0 as a required element for a plaintiff to prove causation, include Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 917-18 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1998); and Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
954 P.2d 829 (Or. App. 1998). See also Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th
Cir. 1994) (decided prior to publication of major epidemiological studies of breast implants and
auto-immune diseases). The court in Hopkins held that where there is no solid body of epidemi-
ology to review, it is appropriate to admit expert testimony that draws on other types of valid
and reliable scientific data). Id. at 1124-1125. Cf Pick v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp.
1151 (E.D. La. 1997) (silicone penile implant case where plaintiff's experts relied largely on
epidemiology concerning silicone breast implants). The court rejected the proposition that epi-
demiology with a relative risk greater than 2.0 is required to admit general causation testimony.
Id. at 1160.
58. See, e.g., Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reasoning that
Bendectin rulings were premised on the fact that there was an "overwhelming body of contradic-
tory epidemiological evidence" aligned against plaintiffs' experts, and should be limited to that
context) (quoting Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, 857 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. 1988)). See also
GREEN, supra note 12, at 307; Green, supra note 49, at 671-72 (arguing that the courts' insistence
on epidemiology for both admissibility and sufficiency of evidence rulings in Bendectin cases
should be limited to situations where strong, well-developed, consistent body of epidemiology
exists). Cf. SANDERS, supra note 5, at 197 (warning that Bendectin litigation sets a dangerous
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The precedential effect of these rulings have been felt well outside
their scientific contexts, however. Courts facing disputes about the
admissibility or sufficiency of plaintiffs' expert causation testimony in
cases dealing with other products have followed the "law" of Bendec-
tin and breast implants to rule that without some epidemiological
studies that show an increase in relative risk of 2.0 or more, plaintiffs
have no relevant, reliable, or admissible evidence. Underscoring the
precedential, substantive law treatment accorded the Bendectin and
breast implant decisions, district courts in the Ninth Circuit, which
produced the Daubert H ruling that the only relevant causation evi-
dence is testimony based on epidemiology that shows a doubling of
the risk, have been most likely to apply this rule to other products.
And, they have adopted this substantive threshold for proof of causa-
tion even where there is not yet any epidemiology studying a product,
or when the epidemiology is still very tentative and preliminary.59
Because the post-Daubert breast implant cases have the potential
for a growing influence on cases dealing with other products with
quite different scientific records, it is worth parsing the reasoning of
two of the most extensive breast implant discussions of the admissibil-
ity of plaintiffs' evidence. Although purporting to rest their admissi-
bility decisions on the Daubert factors of scientific validity and
reliability, the judges in these two cases failed to heed the advice of
neutral scientific experts, and instead made substantive legal rulings
based on relevancy and burdens of proof. The case of Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp.,60 is illustrative of a judge's use of the legal criterion
example for other contexts because in Bendectin the well-developed epidemiological record that
exonerated Bendectin "made it relatively easy to determine that substantial parts of the plain-
tiffs' expert testimony was 'bad' when judged by the ordinary criteria of science").
59. Non-Bendectin and non-breast implant cases in which courts insist on causation testimony
must be predicated on epidemiology that demonstrates at least a doubling of the risk. See, e.g.,
Schudel v. General Elec., 120 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1997) (alleging that workplace exposure to
industrial solvents trichloroethane (TCA) and perchloroethylene (perc) caused neurological and
respiratory impairments); Sanderson v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp.
981, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (connecting between aldehydes in perfume products and multiple
chemical sensitivity); Forsyth v. Eli Lilly Co., No. 95-00185, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 541 (D. Haw.
1998) (connecting the anti-depressant drug Prozac and suicide); In re Hanford Nuclear Reserva-
tion Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15028 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (connecting exposure to radioactive
emissions from nuclear weapons plant and various cancers and thyroid diseases). See also Bar-
tley v. Euclid, 158 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 1998) (in case claiming back injuries from vibrations in coal
hauling equipment, court declined to reach issue of whether epidemiology with a relative risk of
greater than 2.0 is a foundational legal requirement, but then ruling plaintiffs' expert causation
testimony admissible because it meets this epidemiological threshold). This list does not purport
to be exhaustive; it is a sampling of cases obtained through a post-Daubert date restricted LEXIS
search for cases containing the terms "causation and expert and epidemiolog! and relative w/5
risk."
60. 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
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of "relevancy" to reject all scientific evidence that does not rest on
epidemiology with a relative risk greater than 2.0, despite its scientific
validity, and despite the fact that scientists reasonably rely on the
types of rejected evidence to form judgments about causation. This
case involved the consolidated claims of several plaintiffs who alleged
that their leaking or ruptured silicone gel breast implants had caused
various auto-immune diseases. The defendants brought a motion in
limine to exclude all testimony by plaintiffs' experts about a causal
link between implants and the alleged diseases. To exercise its
Daubert gatekeeping role, the trial judge appointed a panel of neutral
scientific experts, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706, to review
the parties' experts' submissions and scientific studies. The judge
asked these neutral "technical advisors" from the fields of epidemiol-
ogy, immunology/toxicology, rheumatology, and chemistry, to issue a
report focusing on five questions drawn from Daubert: (1) Was a par-
ticular plaintiff's expert's opinion supported by scientific reasoning
and methodology that is generally accepted in the field? (2) Is the
opinion based upon scientifically reliable data? (3) If epidemiological
studies are inconclusive, what other types of scientific evidence could
justify a conclusion about the cause of the disease at issue? (4) Do the
methodology and data support the expert's conclusions? (5) Does the
data relied on by the expert apply to the disease in issue in the case, or
does it speak to some other disease or syndrome? 61
The neutral epidemiology expert appointed by the court, Dr.
Merwyn Greenlick, reviewed the opinions and underlying studies of
the two epidemiology experts, Dr. Goldsmith for the plaintiffs, and
the defense expert, Dr. Ory. If the trial judge had followed the advice
of his own neutral scientific expert, and that expert's interpretation of
the Daubert-derived questions, the judge would have admitted the
opinions of both experts, and left to the jury the question of which
differing interpretation should be given greater weight. Dr. Greenlick
concluded that both Dr. Goldsmith and Dr. Ory based their epidemio-
logical opinions on scientifically valid data, and that their "somewhat
different positions [were] a result of different, but legitimate, interpre-
tations" of the sixteen underlying studies.62 Dr. Greenlick castigated
a defense lawyer for inappropriately criticizing or diminishing Dr.
Goldsmith's testimony, and advised the judge that "Dr. Goldsmith's
statement is at the heart of science. Interpreted through the eyes of
an epidemiologist, Dr. Goldsmith is saying that work in the area has
61. Id. at 1393-94.
62. Id. at 1448.
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progressed to the point ... where he and others have begun ... to
take the possibility of an association seriously. '63
In response to the court's question about what types of evidence
could be used to determine causation when faced with inconclusive
epidemiology, Dr. Greenlick advised the court that in light of the fact
that the epidemiology was not definitively negative or positive, but
was sufficient to raise a serious question about the possibility of an
association between silicone implants and auto-immune diseases, it
was scientifically appropriate also to consider animal studies, biophys-
ical data, medical records, differential diagnosis and other types of sci-
entific data. He analogized the causation issue facing the court to that
of a clinician treating a patient. A clinical treating physician cannot
wait for the slow evolution of epidemiological certainty about popula-
tion-wide issues, but must make a judgment on all available scientifi-
cally legitimate sources about what is causing the disease in a
particular patient. 64 Dr. Greenlick then specifically concluded that
"there is sufficient scientific data upon which to base the opinions
both of Dr. Goldsmith and Dr. Ory, the principal epidemiology wit-
nesses, and I believe it would be appropriate to accept both their
testimonies. "65
Judge Jones did not follow this scientific expert advice. He decided
to exclude the testimony of Dr. Goldsmith 66 not because he disagreed
with the neutral expert's scientific analysis, but because he ruled that
as a matter of law, to prove causation "plaintiffs must be able to show
a relative risk of greater than 2.0."67 Consequently, any epidemiologi-
cal expert's opinion testimony, no matter how scientifically valid, is
simply not legally relevant to the issue of causation unless it rests on
studies showing the requisite doubling of risk. In arriving at this rul-
ing, Judge Jones relied not on his scientific experts' reports or on sci-
entific treatises, but on prior court decisions and judicial evidence
manuals-classic sources of law. Thus, this ruling, like those prece-
dents upon which he relied, is not an example of a judge following the
standards of good science to make a case specific and fact specific
63. Id. at 1448-49.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1450.
66. The judge did not have to rule on the admissibility of Dr. Ory's testimony because once he
excluded all of the plaintiffs' expert causation testimony, the plaintiffs had no case, and there was
no need for the defense to put on any evidence. This demonstrates the inherent one-sidedness of
the Daubert rule-it is most likely applied against plaintiffs, but defense experts rarely have to
be subjected to the same scrutiny, although neutral experts and judges in fact take defense ex-
perts' criticisms of plaintiffs' experts' conclusions into account when making admissibility deter-
minations about plaintiffs' experts.
67. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1403.
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evidentiary admissibility determination. It is a legal policy decision, a
conscious choice to reject scientific principles as legally irrelevant,
which could set a precedent with potentially binding relevance far be-
yond the realm of breast implant litigation.
Another important feature of the new toxic causation law fashioned
by the judge in Hall is that it conflates the plaintiffs' overall burden of
proof on causation with the determination of whether to admit any
particular piece of evidence. Once the court declared the legally privi-
leged and determinative role of statistically significant epidemiology
with a relative risk of 2.0 or greater, and then excluded the plaintiffs'
epidemiology experts for not meeting this legal standard, the court
proceeded to exclude the remainder of the plaintiffs' scientific experts
because of the lack of epidemiology experts.68 What the court did,
essentially, was to evaluate each proposed expert's testimony and as-
sess whether it, standing alone, would be sufficient to satisfy the plain-
tiff's overall burden of proof to show that causation is more likely than
not. The judge concluded that none of it was legally relevant or suffi-
cient because it did not rest on admissible epidemiology.
In the guise of evidentiary admissibility determinations, the court
made sufficiency determinations about each individual piece of evi-
dence. Although admissibility decisions are made on individual items
of evidence, this obvious fact does not logically lead to the conclusion
that in order to be admissible, each individual item of evidence must
be itself sufficient, standing alone, to present a jury question.69 To so
hold creates an admissibility and sufficiency criterion that is virtually
impossible for any plaintiff to meet, because it deprives plaintiffs of
68. Again, Judge Jones had to disregard the advice of one of his own appointed neutral ex-
perts. The neutral chemistry expert, Dr. Robert McClard, concluded that the testimony of plain-
tiffs' expert Dr. Garrido, who formed an opinion about the capability of silicone to degrade to
silica, a well-known harmful agent, in the body, was supported by scientifically valid reasoning
and methodology, and was clearly scientifically relevant. Id. at 1473 app. e. See also Vassallo v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998), where the trial judge relied on the same
report from Dr. McClard to conclude that the testimony of the plaintiff's expert was admissible
under the Daubert criteria. Id. at 916.
69. As the Second Circuit noted in cautioning trial judges that they must keep the two inquir-
ies distinct, "admissibility entails a threshold inquiry over whether a certain piece of evidence
ought to be admitted at trial," while the sufficiency of the evidence inquiry "asks whether the
collective weight of a litigant's evidence is adequate to present a jury question." In re Joint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1132 (2d Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit held that Daubert
was not meant to erode the line between admissibility determinations and sufficiency determina-
tions, and that in making admissibility determinations trial judges should not engage in a parsing
of the weight to be given an expert's conclusions. Id. Accord Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So.
2d 552 (Fla. App. 1998). Florida still follows the Frye "general acceptance" standard, but the
court has since ruled that it is inappropriate for trial judges to assess the weight to be given to a
study, or whether an expert's conclusions are unassailable or subject to some criticism, in making
admissibility determinations.
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the entitlement to have their evidence evaluated as a cumulative
whole unless they can produce the magic bullet of the requisite
strength of epidemiological studies.70 Justice Stevens, writing sepa-
rately in Joiner, warned against district judges using their gatekeeping
power to erect such a legal barrier, because it is contrary both to
Daubert and to the methodologies of sound science which Daubert
commanded courts to respect. Castigating the district judge for sepa-
rately examining one by one each study on which plaintiffs' experts
relied, rather than assessing them in their cumulative whole, Justice
Stevens noted that many scientists, including the defendants' experts,
used the cumulative weight of the evidence approach in making causal
judgments. "It is not intrinsically 'unscientific' for experienced profes-
sionals to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all available scientific
evidence-this is not the sort of 'junk science' with which Daubert was
concerned. '71 But the district judge in Hall in effect declared it legally
invalid for scientists to look at the cumulative whole of the scientific
record by, for example, adding to epidemiology with relative risk
above 1.0 but below 2.0, evidence gleaned from animal studies, toxi-
cology, chemical analyses, pathological examinations of plaintiff's tis-
sues, and the differential diagnosis technique of ruling out other
known causal agents, to arrive at an opinion about causation.
In a subsequent breast implant case that relied heavily on Hall, as
well as Bendectin precedents, In re Breast Implant Litigation,72 the
United States District Court in Colorado refined Hall's principle of
causation law by linking the requisite type of epidemiology to the two
elements of causation lurking in every toxic tort case: general and spe-
cific causation. The general causation inquiry asks whether the prod-
uct at issue is capable, in general, of causing the disease. Clearly,
epidemiology, which is the study in large populations of associations
between exposure and illness, is highly relevant evidence to suggest
general causation. The Colorado court, however, declared it to be the
only relevant evidence on general causation, and only if an epidemio-
70. In contrast to the cases discussed supra, courts in Texas have interpreted Daubert as erod-
ing the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence to
prove causation. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183, 189 (Tex.
App. 1989) (interpreting the Texas Supreme Court decision in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.
v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997), as adopting the same criteria for the two inquiries). The
Atterbury court explained that defendants have "two bites at the Daubert apple"-a motion to
exclude the evidence, and then, if the trial judge does not grant that, a motion challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence. Atterbury, supra at 192.
71. Id. at 153.
72. 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Colo. 1998).
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logical study demonstrates a doubling of risk in the general
population.
This ruling is statistically, scientifically, and legally suspect. It is le-
gally dubious because it uses a specific causation standard-whether it
is more likely than not that the product at issue caused the plaintiff's
illness-to adopt a substantive rule about the type and strength of
evidence required for general causation. In other words, the court
made the admissibility of general causation evidence hinge on
whether it, standing alone, would also meet the specific causation bur-
den of proof. By thus collapsing the specific and general causation
inquiries, the Colorado court ruled that as a matter of law, unless
plaintiffs can show that for every single member of the exposed popu-
lation, it is 50% or more likely that her illness is attributable to her
exposure to the product at issue, then no individual plaintiff is entitled
to try to show that she is one of the ones for whom a population-wide
risk of something less than 50% risk became reality.
The plaintiffs' case proceeded on the basis that because epidemio-
logical studies did show some increased risk of auto-immune diseases
among women exposed to silicone gel implants, which did suggest that
a certain percentage (although not 50%) of women with such diseases
may in fact have become ill because of their implants, they should
have been able to offer additional kinds of scientific evidence which
tended to show that it was in fact more likely than not that the individ-
ual plaintiffs were among those whose illnesses could be linked to
their implants. The plaintiffs were seeking to move to the specific cau-
sation case because the epidemiology did show some increased risk in
general, and, when coupled with other scientific evidence, certainly
did not rule out general causation. The court, however, refused to
admit all of the scientific evidence which spoke to specific causation in
the individual plaintiffs, such as clinical testimony, differential diagno-
sis, and examination of silicone in tissue samples of the plaintiffs, not
because it lacked scientific validity or relevance to the specific causa-
tion issues, but because it did not "fit" the general causation issue be-
cause it did not rest on epidemiology with a relative risk greater than
2.0.73
In addition to collapsing general causation into the standard for
proving specific causation, this ruling also collapsed the plaintiff's bur-
den of proof on the fact of individual causation into the population-
73. See In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (discussing specific causation testi-
mony of Dr. Kassan); 1236-37 (discussing specific causation testimony of Dr. Kapper).
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wide probability of causation. 74 As a matter of statistics, it is im-
proper to equate a population-wide risk in an epidemiological study
with the individual probability of causation. Population-wide risk esti-
mates simply do not address, and thus cannot be translated to, the
probability of causation in any one individual.75 Epidemiology, which
is inherently population based, represents a range of values across the
group, not a single risk probability value that can be applied to any
individual.76 The population-wide risk probability cannot take into
account particular susceptibilities of individuals based on factors such
as genetics,77 overall state of health, age, gender, race, amount and
duration of exposure. Furthermore, the probability of individual cau-
sation cannot be computed solely from the population-wide relative
risk, because in some individuals the exposure may accelerate the on-
set of disease that they might have gotten later in life as a result of age
or exposure to other risk factors, and thus in fact, be a substantial
contributing factor to the individual's disease. But statistically, these
cases of accelerated onset tend to get accounted for as background
risk cases, rather than as exposure cases, which can lead to mathemati-
74. See Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of Persuasion, and
Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986). As Gold explains, while traditionally only the
preponderance of the evidence standard of persuasion was defined probabilistically,
in toxic torts, the statistical causation evidence is also expressed probabilistically - as a
factual estimate of the defendant's contribution to the plaintiff's risk. The failure to
distinguish between the two kinds of probability has led to the collapse of the factual
burden and preponderance standard into a single test: does the factual probability of
causation exceed 50%?
Id. at 379. As Gold then demonstrates, this subtly yet substantively alters causation law, tighten-
ing the standard plaintiffs must meet, and narrowing the evidentiary focus to probabilistic statis-
tical evidence such as epidemiology-precisely what the courts effectuated in Hall and In re
Breast Implant Litigation. Id. at 392.
75. Id. at 390.
76. See James Robins & Sander Greenland, The Probability of Causation Under a Stochastic
Model for Individual Risk, 45 BIOMENTRICS 1125, 1126 (1989); Thompson, supra note 3, at 254-
56.
77. See, e.g., Cranor et al., supra note 48, at 39-40. For example, population-wide breast im-
plant studies included in the exposed groups both women with implants which were still intact,
and presumably, given the high rupture rates, women whose implants had ruptured, whether
they knew of the rupture or not. Thus, the studies were not designed to take into account
whether an individual's implant had ruptured, how long ago it had ruptured, how much silicone
had leaked into her body, or where it had migrated to. Yet these individualistic factors of the
amount and duration of exposure to silicone in the body could affect an individual's susceptibil-
ity in immune responses, i.e. they might make it more likely in an individual case that the indi-
vidual was one of the people upon whom the slightly elevated population-wide relative risk in
fact came to rest.
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cal underestimation of both the population wide relative risk, and the
individual risk probability. 78
Statisticians, epidemiologists, and many other types of scientists un-
derstand the numerous reasons why it is invalid to equate the increase
in relative risk in the population being studied with the probability of
causation in any individual case. But these reasons seem to have
eluded the comprehension of those judges who have made the mis-
leadingly simple equation of legal relevance and the burden of proof
on either general or specific causation with epidemiology that demon-
strates a relative risk of 2.0 or greater. Dr. Greenlick, the court-ap-
pointed neutral expert in Hall, argued that from the perspective of
science, and epidemiology in particular, plaintiffs should be able to try
to prove a specific causation case when the epidemiology shows a rela-
tive risk of less than 2.0:
From a scientific point of view it is not appropriate to disregard rel-
ative risks of less than 2.0. First of all, relative risk is a term that
applies to a population, not to an individual. While it is possible to
estimate the average increased risk for members of a population, it
is really not appropriate to assume that each individual in a popula-
tion actually had a similar risk. It is much more appropriate to be-
lieve that the average increased risk is made up of a wide range in
individual risks in the population . . .79
Even Dr. Marcia Angell, the executive editor of the New England
Journal of Medicine, who has been so stridently critical of the breast
implant litigation, and argues forcefully for elevating epidemiology
above all other forms of scientific evidence in the courtroom,80 has
had to acknowledge that one of the breast implant epidemiological
studies showing a relative risk of 1.24,81 could mean that breast im-
plants have in fact caused the auto-immune disease in some individual
women. This relative risk could mean, she writes, that in every two
out of twelve ill women with breast implants,
the implants were the sole cause of their disease and in the other 10
they played no role. Or it could mean that implants played a major
role in 3 or 4 women and a very small one in the others. Or it could
78. See Sander Greenland, Relation of Probability of Causation to Relative Risk and Doubling
Dose: A Methodologic Error That Has Become a Social Problem, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1166,
1167 (1999).
79. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1450-51 app. B (D. Or. 1996).
80. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL (1996).
81. Charles H. Hennekens et al., Self-reported Breast Implants and Connective-Tissue Diseases
in Female Health Professionals, 275 JAMA 616, 618 (1996).
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mean that implants contributed a varying amount to the disease in
all 12.82
Some courts who have adopted the evidentiary requirement of epi-
demiology with a relative risk greater than 2.0 apparently, but errone-
ously think they are just adhering to the teaching of Daubert by
following the accepted tenets of the scientific discipline of epidemiol-
ogy. Other courts, displaying a far better understanding of science
and the limits of epidemiology, have explicitly rejected the substantive
causation rule that plaintiffs must have epidemiology with a relative
risk of greater than 2.0 in order to prove causation. Adhering to the
precepts of epidemiology, these courts have recognized that because
studies that define risk factors do not address the cause of a disease in
any particular person, it is irrational and unfair to require an individ-
ual plaintiff to produce a magic bullet level of increased population-
wide risk. As a New Jersey court explained:
an epidemiologist cannot state that it is more likely than not that a
particular case of colon cancer was caused by the asbestos .... A
medical doctor, however, or even one otherwise acquainted with the
physiology of a particular patient and the progress of the disease,
may make a medical judgment concerning the origin of the disease,
factoring together epidemiological studies, other types of scientific ev-
idence, and known individual risk factors or individual susceptibility
that might enhance the risk of exposure, "even though the risk in the
study fell short of the 2.0 correlation. ' 83 The court went on to reject
the defendants' argument that experts should not be able to testify to
causation unless epidemiology established a threshold relative risk of
2.0 as "proving too much." Under the defendants' proposed rule, no
plaintiff could recover if a study showed the increased risk was 1.99,
but all could potentially recover if it were 2.1, a result that "makes
little sense, scientifically or legally. '84
Similarly, other courts rejecting the epidemiological threshold have
recognized that scientists themselves factor in evidence other than epi-
demiology in making causal judgments, especially individual causal
judgments. It is scientifically legitimate to use epidemiological evi-
82. ANGELL, supra note 80, at 197 (quoted in In re Breast Implant Litigation, 11 F. Supp. 2d
1217, 1226 (D. Colo. 1998)). Judge Sparr failed to appreciate the import of this quote, however,
when he rejected all of the plaintiffs' specific causation testimony because the elevated risk in the
population in general was not greater than 50%.
83. Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671, 675 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (deci-
sion that epidemiology of a relative risk greater than 2.0 was not required to prove causation
later adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079
(N.J. 1992)).
84. Id.
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dence that falls short of the 2.0 relative risk level in combination with
clinical or other experimental evidence which strengthens the infer-
ence of causation in an individual case.85 Other courts have allowed
expert medical causation testimony when no epidemiology had even
been conducted on whether there is a statistical link between expo-
sure to the toxin in question and the plaintiff's illness, recognizing that
it can be medically and scientifically acceptable to base diagnostic
judgments on other types of evidence.86 As the Third Circuit
explained:
[i]n the actual practice of medicine, physicians do not wait for con-
clusive, or even published and peer-reviewed, studies to make diag-
noses to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. However,
experience with hundreds of patients, discussions with peers, at-
tendance at conferences and seminars, detailed review of a patient's
family, personal, and medical histories, and thorough physical ex-
aminations are the tools of the trade, and should suffice for the
making of a differential diagnosis even in those cases in which peer-
reviewed studies do not exist to confirm the diagnosis of the
physician. 87
The consistency of this reasoning with accepted precepts of science
and medicine is reflected in its similarity to the recommendation of
Dr. Greenlick, the neutral expert epidemiologist in Hall. Displaying
notable perceptiveness that the causation issue in a toxic tort case is
more like the individual clinical medical judgment than the popula-
tion-wide statistical risk estimates of the epidemiologist, he noted that
courts, like clinicians, have to make concrete decisions about what is
causing a particular person's illness, and often have to do so in the
face of less than definitive science. As Dr. Greenlick explained, clini-
cians making diagnoses do not have the luxury of waiting for epidemi-
ology to arrive at more conclusive, relatively certain decisions about
risk levels in general populations.
Physicians [must] do the best they can in an uncertain situation.
They use all of the sources of information at their disposal, includ-
ing animal studies, case reports, small or inconclusive epidemiologi-
85. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995); Ambrosini v.
Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
86. See, e.g., Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999); Kennedy v. Collagen
Corp., 161 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1998); Zuchowitz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998);
Benedi v. McNeil-PPC Inc., 66 F.3d 1378 (4th Cir. 1995); McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d
1038 (2d Cir. 1995).
87. Heller, 167 F.3d at 155. This case demonstrates that this does not mean abandonment of
all judicial scrutiny of an expert's opinion testimony. However, the court went on to approve the
exclusion of the central part of plaintiff's medical expert testimony because the experts' conclu-
sions were not supported by the temporal relationship between exposure and onset of symp-
toms, and cessation of exposure and the end of symptoms. Id. at 164-65.
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cal studies, expert opinions, conversations with colleagues, and,
most importantly, their own clinical experience and judgment....
[P]hysicians are not dealing with the general scientific question
"What causes disease in women?"; they are dealing with the partic-
ularistic clinical question "What is causing disease in this particular
woman?" Those are very different questions. And the physician
must draw some working causal model in the case of a single pa-
tient, even in the face of a great deal of uncertainty. The scientist
has the luxury of reporting that there isn't yet sufficient data to
draw a conclusion. That luxury isn't available to the clinician, be-
cause the decision to do nothing in a clinical situation is selecting a
specific course of action.88
The courts that insist on epidemiology of a certain risk probability
have not explicitly rejected the view that the causation judgment is
more akin to an individual clinical judgment than a probabilistic risk
assessment. Instead, they acknowledge that they are not following the
principles of science, but are making a legal policy determination to
equate epidemiology, relative risk, general causation, and the burden
of proof on individual causation. Conceding that epidemiology and
other methods of science cannot directly prove causation, the Texas
Supreme Court in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner ex-
plained its decision to nevertheless require plaintiffs to produce epide-
miological studies with a relative risk of greater than 2.0 as a policy
determination that "strikes a balance between the needs of our legal
system and the limits of science. ' 89 The California Federal District
Court in Sanderson v. International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc.,90 was
even more blunt about the policy reasons underlying its decision.
When faced with the plaintiff's argument that the fact that her alleged
problem had never made its way onto the research agenda of any epi-
demiologist created an unfair dilemma, the court said her only option
was to "Wait." A question that is capable of being answered by sci-
ence should await such an answer, and the courts, given their needs
for certainty, efficiency, finality, and social legitimacy, should await
the "laggardly pace" of the scientific research process.
Given the difficulties in legal resolution of scientific controversies
... and the great benefit to society in scientific resolution of scien-
tific controversies - meaning the progressive and continuous rejec-
tion, refinement, and confirmation of hypotheses - the Court cannot
avoid thinking that the framers of Rule 702 did well to make law a
prisoner to science, not the other way around. 91
88. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387,1449 (D. Or. 1996) (quoting Greenlick
report).
89. Id. at 718.
90. 950 F. Supp. 981 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
91. Id. at 1004.
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Thus, in the evolving post-Daubert case law, we have a sharp diver-
gence of judicial opinion. One view is that judges should allow testi-
mony if it is based on the types of evidence reasonably relied on by
scientists, including clinical diagnosticians, and should not insist on ep-
idemiology, or a certain required level of relative risk in epidemiologi-
cal studies, because science itself does not always insist on such
evidence. Under this view, it is fundamentally erroneous, both as a
matter of law and science, to adopt the illusory equation of population
based relative risk with the burden of proof on causation. Under this
view, the law does not have to await scientific or epidemiological cer-
tainty before considering a casual judgment, because scientists them-
selves do not so insist. The contrasting legal view is that relative risk
and individual burdens of proof can, as a matter of legal policy, be
equated, because that is a simple device for judges to screen out scien-
tific evidence, especially when a scientific issue is novel, or hotly de-
bated, or highly uncertain. According to this view, the law should wait
for a relative degree of scientific certainty, at least in the form of a
strong epidemiological risk association. Law thus exalts epidemiology
above other scientific disciplines, and makes the same highly con-
servative value choice on causation that epidemiology itself makes: it
is worse to conclude that there is a causal relationship when in fact
there turns out not to be one (a Type I false positive error), than it is
to conclude that there is no causal relationship when in fact there is
such a relationship (a Type II false negative error).
The growing number of courts that are adopting this position, influ-
enced by the legal rulings adopted in Bendectin and breast implant
cases, are only considering one side of the normative and policy pic-
ture. They are insisting on a strict, statistically inaccurate adherence
to burdens of proof on causation, because of reluctance to move the
law ahead of scientific uncertainty, out of concern for the potentially
adverse consequences for defendants whose products might errone-
ously be judged to have caused a particular type of harm. But these
courts have failed to consider many important value and policy con-
siderations: the consequences for the tort goal of deterring risky cor-
porate behavior, the potential for discouraging a more adequate level
of safety research, the synergistic effect that the legal system has on
stimulating scientific research, the potential disparate impact on cer-
tain social groups who have traditionally been neglected by the scien-
tific research community, and the burdens on injured people who may
well have causally legitimate claims that they have been injured by an
inadequately tested drug or carelessly made device or improperly dis-
posed or dispersed toxic chemical. The final section of this article ex-
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plores these important policy implications of the legal trend to require
an epidemiological threshold for proof of causation.
IV. THE NORMATIVE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
HEIGHTENED CAUSATION STANDARDS
When a judge adopts a substantive rule of tort causation law that
bars plaintiffs from proceeding to try to prove individual causation
unless they have a requisite degree of epidemiology, the court is mak-
ing a legal policy decision to align the values of the law with the inher-
ently conservative posture of the discipline of epidemiology towards
risk. Dr. Greenlick, the court-appointed epidemiological expert in
Hall, displayed notable perception about the different value systems
of epidemiology and the law when he posited that the task facing
judges and juries ought to be conceived of as more like that of the
clinician than the epidemiologist. As Dr. Greenlick explained, epide-
miology proceeds cautiously and conservatively, loathe to give up the
assumption that there is no relationship between a particular agent
and disease.
The process of epidemiological inquiry can be characterized by the
formation of a suspicion of causality, followed by slow and careful,
sometimes agonizing, movement along a continuum from a zero
level of certainty about causality toward, but rarely to, a level of
absolute certainty. The language that epidemiologists and other sci-
entist use to describe their level of certainty is a very conservative
language, one that generally understates their degree of certainty
about an association between a factor and a disease and about a
causal link between these factors. 92
Indeed, epidemiology is so inherently conservative in its reluctance to
abandon the null hypothesis that it is far more willing to tolerate false
negatives-the rejection of a causal association when one may actu-
ally exist-than false positives-the attribution of an association when
one does not exist.93 This inherent conservatism about accepting the
possibility of a causal association is reflected in the high relative risk
threshold preferred by epidemiologists, and in the discipline's prefer-
ence that an association should be replicated in several studies before
embracing a causal ascription.94 In terms relevant to the products lia-
bility arena, the discipline of epidemiology posits that it is better to be
92. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1449 app. B.
93. See Farrell, supra note 3, at 2210.
94. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 251-56 (noting that while any relative risk greater than 1.0
indicates a positive association between exposure to the product in question and the disease,
epidemiologists often do not embrace a causal relationship until studies have demonstrated a
very strong level of association, such as a relative risk of greater than 3.0).
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wrong by saying a product is completely safe when it is actually pro-
ducing some harm, than it is to erroneously say it is risky. These rigor-
ous statistical significance standards of certainty about an effect and
willingness to accept false positives are the normative values of epide-
miology "because nothing less than the establishment or confirmation
of a predictive rule of nature rests on these test results. '95
By being reluctant to abandon the null hypothesis, and thus insist-
ing on very strong associations before doing so, epidemiologists are
quite willing to tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity. Courts, however,
have to be careful not to be mislead by the qualifying tenuousness and
unwillingness to speak in legal cause terms that characterize epidemi-
ologists' written or testimonial reports. As one appellate court ex-
plained, in chastising a trial judge for rejecting plaintiffs' expert
causation testimony because the epidemiological studies were equivo-
cal about causation and called for further study, epidemiology usually
speaks in terms of uncertainty because it is not designed to make
causal determinations, but only to identify probabilities of a risk asso-
ciation.96 Moreover, medical science research articles qualify their
conclusions and call for further study not as "an expression of igno-
rance, but rather [as] an expression that all scientific fields are open-
ended and can progress from their present state. '97 Epidemiologists
do not have to make decisions about who should financially bear a
risk, or about how responsibility for ascertaining and reducing a risk
should be allocated.
A court, on the other hand, has to make concrete decisions about
what is causing a particular person's illness, a question on which statis-
tical associational probabilities are only one form of relevant evi-
dence, and only one relevant policy consideration. In making these
individualistic causation judgments, tort law has often recognized that
it is doing more than just ascertaining scientific "truth." It is making
policy judgments about which party should bear the responsibility for
causal uncertainty, and which party is in the best position to learn
more about and absorb or spread the costs of the risks. 98 But, by in-
95. Farrell, supra note 3, at 2210.
96. See Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 552, 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
97. Id. at 568 n.12.
98. That the law of causation has often been driven by consideration of the policy goals of tort
law has long been recognized by scholars. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the
Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Wex S. Malone, Rumi-
nations in Cause in Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956). Courts have frequently crafted principles of
causation, including relaxing the traditional requirements for plaintiffs, in order to achieve or
balance tort goals such as compensation of innocent plaintiffs, deterrence, risk spreading, or
fairness. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1948) (shifting the burden of proof on causation to defendants where plaintiff was unable to
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sisting on an attainment of a scientific certainty which is rarely likely
to exist, and which cannot be supplied by epidemiology, a judge is not,
like a scientist, just deferring decision until more research becomes
available. Rather, a judge is selecting a specific course of action that
definitively resolves important social and legal rights: this plaintiff, or
this group of injured people, will receive no compensation from the
manufacturer, and this product is therefore likely to continue to be
marketed and labeled as "safe," even if the epidemiological studies
have too quickly embraced a false negative,99 or when they say that
the increased risk factor is only 1.9, rather than 2.1, or when epidemi-
ology shows some increase in risk and other scientific and individual
diagnostic evidence bolsters the conclusion that the risk did in fact fall
on the plaintiff.100
The tort system should not slavishly follow the values of epidemiol-
ogy because its purposes and social functions have always included a
"justice" role that is broader in scope than whether scientists have
arrived at a conclusion, or whatever happens to be the scientific
"truth" consensus of the moment.101 Policy or "justice" considera-
tions which are appropriately central concerns of tort law include fac-
prove which of two negligent wrongdoers caused his single injury); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) (adopting market share proportionate liability approach when
plaintiffs, through no fault of their own, could not prove which of several negligent manufactur-
ers made the drug that caused their individual injuries); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp. Inc.,
741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987) (allowing plaintiffs to recover proportionate damages when misdiag-
nosis deprived them of chance of surviving cancer, even though plaintiffs could not prove the
malpractice caused their death); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983)
(allowing plaintiff to recover percentage of damages when doctor's delayed diagnosis reduced
plaintiff's chance of recovery from terminal illness).
99. Some courts and commentators have noted that because the law makes causal decisions
for a different purpose than science does, and uses different criteria for where to place the bur-
den of persuasion, the law should not always insist on the 95% level of statistical significance
(designed to screen out Type I errors) before admitting a scientific study. See DeLuca v. Merrell
Dow Pharm.s, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 947 (3d Cir. 1993); Farrell, supra note 3, at 2210-13. For norma-
tive reasons, where the purpose of a legal decision is to award compensation for personal loss,
the law should adopt a lower degree of certainty, perhaps an 80% standard of statistical signifi-
cance, and thus display greater tolerance for false positives. Farrell, supra note 3, at 2211.
100. Many people, including scientists, clinicians, public health regulators, and especially po-
tential consumers, would consider a relative risk of 1.9 or even 1.5 to be a serious matter. If the
relative risk is 1.9, this means that for every 100 cases of the disease in the unexposed popula-
tion, there are 190 cases in the exposed population-a 90% increase, albeit not the 100% in-
crease in numbers of cases required by the relative risk standard of 2.0. Translated into what is
known as the Attributable Risk Fraction, the percentage likelihood that instances of the disease
among the exposed group are related to the exposure, a relative risk of 1.9 means it is 47.37%
likely that any exposed persons' disease is related to the exposure.
101. For discussions of the different value systems and purposes of scientific research and
legal decisionmaking, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF
SCIENCE IN THE LAW (1999); SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Galileo's Tribute: Using Medical
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tors such as which party is better able to bear the risk of injury and
scientific uncertainty-the injured plaintiff or the manufacturer, who
may be able to spread the risk among all consumers. They also in-
clude the value judgment that if the uncertainty is due largely to the
manufacturer's failure to conduct sufficiently rigorous pre-marketing
testing, or post-marketing testing when reports of potential problems
arose, then it may be both fair to the injured person and consistent
with the goal of deterrence to make the manufacturer absorb some of
the cost of injuries.10 2 It may also include the value judgment that it is
better to withhold or withdraw a product from the market-especially
a cosmetic, or convenience, or non-life saving product, or a product
with several equally effective and possibly safer alternatives-until it
is more conclusively proven safe, than the alternative of continuing to
market a product until it is conclusively proven unsafe. 10 3 This is the
social value judgment that most consumers endorse. Indeed, consum-
ers often believe that the regulatory system is far more rigorous and
effective than it is, and thus assume that if a drug or medical device or
food supplement is on the market, it must have been thoroughly
tested by the manufacturer or the government and demonstrated to
be safe. For this reason, when juries in products liability cases are
presented with evidence of minimal testing by manufacturers, or con-
scious decisions not to follow up on trouble signs in animal tests or
adverse post-marketing safety reports, they often find manufacturers
Evidence in Court, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2055 (1977); Farrell, supra note 3; Peter Schuck, Multi-
Culturalism Redux: Science, Law and Politics, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y. REV. 1 (1993).
102. Some commentators discussing the problems scientific uncertainty poses for tort causa-
tion law have proposed shifting the burden of proof on causation to manufacturers when the
uncertainty is largely due to their failure adequately to test, follow-up, and sponsor research
about the risks of their product. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation:
Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997) (propos-
ing dispensing with traditional proof of causation requirement and instead resting liability on
proof that the defendant inadequately tested or disclosed information necessary to assess latent
risks); Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1, 45 (1995) (proposing shifting the burden of proof on cause-in-fact, or allowing proportionate
50% damages recovery, when plaintiffs can demonstrate strong scientific uncertainty about cau-
sation); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 COR-
NELL L. REV. 773 (1997) (proposing the adoption of a presumption that insufficiently tested
product caused plaintiffs' harm, which the manufacturer could overcome by proving it did ade-
quate research and that research proves the product is safe).
103. This value judgment parallels the public health protective values of the regulatory sys-
tem, such as the FDA. See Kessler, supra note 2, at 1713. The FDA was prompted by this value
calculus when it acted to withdraw the wildly popular anti-obesity drug combination "fen-phen"
in advance of large scale epidemiological studies that later substantiated the risk first alerted in
clusters of case reports. See Milo Garibaldi, An American Fiasco: Diet Pills 1996-97, 5 PHARMA-
CEUTICAL NEws 8-12 (1998); Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, FDA Announces
Withdrawal of Fenfluramine and Dexfenfluramine, Sept. 15, 1997, available at <www.fda.gov/
cder/news/fenphenpr8l597.html>.
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liable, including for punitive damages, even in the face of inconclusive
or weak individual causation evidence. 10 4 While manufacturers may
certainly view this tendency to determine liability despite uncertain
science as alarming, it is reflective of strongly held community values
that one should not market a product, especially one to be placed in
the human body or ingested by people, without extensive safety test-
ing and heightened concern about danger signs. When the tort system
does not insist on well settled conclusive epidemiology as a threshold
requirement for proof of causation, it allows expression of these im-
portant community values, it avoids rewarding manufacturers who de-
liberately choose not to do adequate safety research, and it thus
encourages more socially and scientifically beneficial safety behavior
by manufacturers. 10 5
Those courts that have made epidemiology the sine qua non of
proof of causation are making a normative judgment to tolerate or
even encourage a high degree of uncertainty about the dangers of
some products, to reward manufacturers for ignoring risk, and to re-
quire consumers to bear more of the burden of scientific uncertainty
than manufacturers. The troubling policy implications of this norma-
tive choice become even more apparent when one considers the often
unappreciated synergistic effects between the tort system and scien-
tific research. A surprisingly large number of products, drugs, and
medical devices are brought to market with disturbingly little safety
testing, especially for long-term effects, or for effects on population
groups, such as women or children, who were not included among the
clinical trial subjects. 10 6 Moreover, many drugs wind up being pre-
104. This aspect of jury decision making has been labeled "commingling" evidence of liability
with evidence of causation, thus blending strong evidence on one element with weak evidence on
the other, to arrive at a balancing judgment. See SANDERS, supra note 5, at 130-39 (analyzing
this commingling by juries in Bendectin cases). For a discussion of the possibility of jurors dis-
trusting manufacturer's uncertain evidence of safety in light of the woefully egregious state of
their testing in breast implant litigation, see Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast Implants Revisited:
Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 705, 740-43 (1997). A plaintiffs' lawyer who was very
successful in obtaining plaintiff verdicts in breast implant litigation openly admitted his trial
strategy was to focus on the powerful evidence of the manufacturer misconduct, and to down-
play the causation issue. See Amy Singer, Look Over Here: How John O'Quinn Directed A
Jury's Attention Toward the Strongest Elements of His Case - And Won The Largest Verdict Ever
In A Breast Implant Suit, AM. LAW., March 1993, at 86.
105. See Wagner, supra note 102, at 828-32; Dresser et al., supra note 104, at 740-43.
106. Wagner extensively discusses the paucity of safety information available for many drugs
or chemicals to which workers or citizens are frequently exposed. See Wagner, supra note 102.
Even when a drug has been relatively thoroughly tested, we may have virtually no information
about its safety or efficacy in women, because until recently, women were excluded from clinical
trials. See R. Alta Charo, Protecting Us To Death: Women, Pregnancy, and Clinical Research
Trials, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 135, 137-40 (1993); Vanessa Merton, The Exclusion of Pregnant,
Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People (a.k.a. Women) from Biomedical Research, 19 AM. J. L.
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scribed for conditions or under usage circumstances other than the
ones for which they were tested and approved-known as "off-label"
use. 10 7 For these and other reasons, safety problems often do not be-
come apparent until after regulatory approval, once a product or drug
is on the market.
The products liability system has played a notable role in bringing
some of these serious safety problems to light, and in prompting long-
overdue regulatory action and scientific research. Scientific research
and publication agendas are not set in a political vacuum.'08 A sud-
den onslaught of tort cases claiming a product has caused a disease
can elevate an issue to the forefront of scientific interest, of the inter-
est of research funders, including the government and manufacturers,
and of the interest of the editors of scientific journals. Tort cases, par-
ticularly when they initially result in large plaintiffs' verdicts, also
& MED. 369, 370-73 (1993). Even when a product like a contraceptive must be tested on women
because it is designed for use only in women's bodies, risks may be ignored or underestimated
because women's health complaints are trivialized or dismissed as attributable to emotional
problems. See Lucinda M. Finley, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Women's Reproductive
Health, in CORPORATE VICIMIZATION OF WOMEN 59-97 (Elizabeth Szockyj & James G. Fox
eds., 1996); Nancy Krieger & Elizabeth Fee, Man-Made Medicine and Women's Health: The Bio-
politics of Sex/Gender and Race/Ethnicity, in MAN-MADE MEDICINE: WOMEN'S HEALTH, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND REFORM 15-27 (Kary L. Moss ed., 1996).
107. See Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved
Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181 (1999); Jaime A.
Wilsker, One-Half Phen in the Morning/One Fen Before Dinner: A Proposal For FDA Regulation
of Off-Label Uses of Drugs, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 795 (1998). The FDA recently promulgated new
regulations governing the off-label uses of drugs, and the information manufacturers may circu-
late to doctors about such uses. See Dissemination of Information on Unapproved New Uses for
Marketed New Drugs, Biologics, and Devices, 63 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Nov. 20, 1998).
108. Some courts have recognized this reality, and have taken it into consideration to reach
conflicting decisions about whether a plaintiff can have sufficient proof of causation without any,
or extensive epidemiology. Compare Zuchowitz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 385 (2d Cir.
1998) (finding that no studies of toxic effects of drug Danocrine at doses higher than recom-
mended dose had been done, that no studies of intentional overdoses could ethically be per-
formed, and number of cases of women exposed to overdoses was too small to conduct
meaningful epidemiology, and taking these factors into account as one of bases for decision that
plaintiff had sufficient proof linking overdose to her fatal lung disease despite lack of epidemio-
logical proof), and Ambrosini v. LaBarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that it would
be impossible and unethical to conduct epidemiological study to further quantify an association
between the contraceptive drug Depo-Provera and birth defects because FDA had banned use
of drug during pregnancy out of concern about possible birth defects, and holding that plaintiff
does not need well-settled epidemiological studies linking her precise defect with Depo-
Provera), with Sanderson v. International Flavors & Fragrances, 950 F. Supp. 981 (C.D. Cal.
1996). In Sanderson, experts testified that the dearth of research on the connection between
fragrance products and various illnesses was attributable to the fact that the research community
had no political or monetary reason to be interested in the issue. 950 F. Supp, at 994. The court
held that a plaintiff has no case until the day when science decides to study the problem and
reaches epidemiological threshold of extensive studies that show doubling of relative risk. Id. at
1003-04. The decision in Sanderson virtually guarantees that no such research ever will be done.
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stimulate media and public awareness of potential health and safety
problems, with consequent demands for firmer answers, which also
pushes the research and regulatory agenda. The tort system played a
highly significant, perhaps crucial role in bringing to public attention,
and prompting further scientific investigation and understanding of
the risks of asbestos, agent orange, thalidomide, mer/29, accutane,
DES, the Dalkon shield, Bjork-Shiley heart valves, and now the fen-
fluramine diet drugs.10 9 Even in the instances of Bendectin and sili-
cone breast implants, where the science stimulated by the tort suits"0
has turned out to show that the risk is either much less than initially
feared or so small as to be unprovable by the limited detection power
of epidemiology, both the public health and individuals are still better
off for the research into the effects of these products that had long
been used without sufficient testing. Science gained new understand-
ing into the processes and risk factors for birth defects; cavalier atti-
tudes about giving any drug to pregnant women were changed; less
expensive and equally or more effective alternatives for treating
morning sickness were promoted; doctors and potential breast implant
recipients learned far more about the risks of product failure, rupture,
leakage, and local complications such as infections, granulomas, and
hardening around the implants; implant manufacturers were stimu-
lated to produce better quality and safer saline implants; women were
reassured about the possibility of auto-immune disorders; and con-
cerns over the safety of the silicone implants also prompted increased
biomaterials research and quests for devices that could be better bio-
logically integrated with natural tissue.
Under the new heightened, epidemiology-deferential causation law,
these often beneficial effects of the tort system in stimulating scientific
research may be shut down. If tort law insists that plaintiffs cannot
proceed to trial without already well-developed science, manufactur-
109. For discussions of how litigation over some of these products has stimulated renewed
research interest and greater scientific, regulatory, and public understanding of the dangers, see,
for example, Finley, supra note 106, at 59-97; Dreyfuss, supra note 101, at 2066-67; Wagner,
supra note 102, at 822-25; Dresser et al., supra note 104, at 743-45; Paul D. Rheingold, The MER]
29 Story B An Instance of Successful Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968).
110. SANDERS, supra note 5, at 61-83 (charting how the scientific research into Bendectin grew
in response to the litigation, and then tailed off dramatically as the litigation came to an end).
Dresser shows a timeline relating virtually all of the research into the connection between breast
implants and auto-immune diseases to the onset and growth of the litigation. Dresser et al.,
supra note 104, at 743-45. Dresser and colleagues posit that but for the litigation, this product
that had been used untested for over thirty years in women's bodies would have remained un-
studied. Id. The FDA, which failed to require manufacturers to submit safety data for eight
years after it first requested that they do so, also might never have acted to take a second look at
implants and require the first ever controlled clinical trials, as well as more accurate reporting of
rupture rates and other localized complications. See id. at 735-39.
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ers will have a perverse incentive to avoid or suppress adequate safety
research."' There will be fewer reasons for epidemiologists to be-
come interested in studying products when the courthouse door is pre-
maturely slammed. Similarly, there will be little reason for funders,
especially pharmaceutical companies and product manufacturers, to
support epidemiological research into the health effects of products
already on the market. If the consequence of no epidemiological re-
search being performed is to largely insulate a manufacturer from lia-
bility, then why would any reasonable manufacturer want to fund
post-marketing studies when they may lead to sustaining lawsuits?
Manufacturers would also have an incentive to lobby regulatory agen-
cies and government research funding entities to keep a product off
their research radar screen, or to retain the leading experts and even
pay them to refrain from investigating the possibility of a causal asso-
ciation between a product and a disease.
The way judges have applied the new heightened causation rules
and interpreted tentative or inconclusive epidemiological studies may
also stifle further scientific research, because the tort system has
rushed to premature "closure" on some products or scientific issues.
The adversarial nature of the legal system demands "either/or" or
"yes/no" answers to questions such as causation. This feature, cou-
pled with the dramatic financial stakes hinging on the outcome of
mass torts, has produced a tendency on the part of judges, prompted
by their own misunderstanding of epidemiology, 1 2 or by misleading
attributions of conclusiveness by defense counsel and defense expert
witnesses, to make illusory ascriptions of certainty to epidemiological
111. As Wendy Wagner has pointed out, tort causation law already creates too many disincen-
tives for manufacturers against thoroughly studing the risks of their products. See Wagner, supra
note 102, at 774-75. See also Berger, supra note 102, at 2138-40; Feldman, supra note 102, at 44-
45. Since large scale epidemiology on the effects of drug use in the general population can only
ethically be done retrospectively (once a drug is already marketed), this new heightened stan-
dard of causal proof also reduces incentives against following up on post-marketing adverse
incident reports or other signals of risk that come to light once large numbers of people are
taking a drug outside the careful confines of the clinical trial. See Berger, supra note 102, at
2128.
112. Judge Weinstein's opinion in the Agent Orange Litigation is an example of a judge misun-
derstanding the language and reasoning of epidemiology to declare studies that arrived at no
certain conclusion either way as conclusively negative, i.e. as positively ruling out an association
between the dioxin in Agent Orange and cancers and other health problems of Vietnam veter-
ans. See In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). Judge
Weinstein's use of uncertain epidemiology has been criticized by commentators studying the
Agent Orange Litigation. See Schuck, supra note 101, at 11-14; Green, supra note 49.
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
studies that by their terms say the matter is hardly closed, and call for
further inquiry.113
Breast implant litigation provides an illuminating example of this
tendency of the adversarial tort system to translate inconclusive epide-
miology as positively ruling out any association. The two largest scale
epidemiological studies of breast implants and a variety of auto-im-
mune diseases or symptoms did show some slight increased risk of a
few diseases or clusters of reported symptoms that could indicate im-
mune system dysfunction. While the authors concluded that their re-
search failed to demonstrate a strong or clear link between silicone
implants and auto-immune disorders, they carefully noted that neither
did the studies disprove or otherwise rule out an association. Like the
good researchers that they were, they called for further studies.114
Defense experts, when asked to testify in the "yes or no-causation or
not" terms of legal discourse, erroneously described these studies as
conclusively establishing lack of causation.1 5 Dr. Greenlick, the
court-appointed neutral expert in Hall, took a defense expert to task
for this, and noted that his assessment of the epidemiology as showing
that silicone was not associated with auto-immune diseases was "at
odds with the way some, or perhaps most, epidemiologists would as-
sess the literature. 11 6 "When expert witnesses testify within the cul-
ture of the adversarial judicial process, they construct their opinions
on a base of science, but they easily depart from the norms of science
in the language they use to offer their opinions," Dr. Greenlick ex-
plained." 7 "While they are cautious and conservative as they state
opinions in formal scientific discourse, in the courtroom they describe
their views in far stronger and more certain language.""118 Thus were
studies that said the issue of an association between silicone and vari-
ous auto-immune syndromes was still open, with sufficient signs of
risk worth taking seriously and requiring further study, translated into
studies that "proved" there was no connection.
The court rulings saying plaintiffs did not have proof of causation
were often couched in similarly conclusive terms about the state of the
113. See SANDERS, supra note 5, at 110-15, 195-97 (discussing how the adversarial process of
litigation leads to an unhealthy deconstruction of science, overemphasizing the flaws in studies,
and ascribing greater negative certitude or positive strength than is scientifically warranted for
inevitably inconclusive studies).
114. See Sherine E. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Other Disorders
After Breast Implantation, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1697, 1701-02 (1994); Hennekens et al., supra
note 81, at 681.
115. See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
116. Id. at 1449.
117. Id. at 1448.
118. Id.
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science: the legal system has now largely declared silicone gel breast
implants conclusively "safe," even though no scientific study does so.
Through this process, the new causation law has led to illusory cer-
tainty and premature closure on scientific and public health issues that
warrant further investigation. 119 But once a court has declared a sci-
entific case closed, what incentive is there to keep performing time
consuming and expensive long-term, large-scale epidemiological stud-
ies? Manufacturers will want to embrace the legal declaration of clo-
sure; journal editors and peer reviewers are likely either to consider
continued research not sufficiently important or original to deserve
publication, or to cast aspersions on the researcher for defying con-
ventional scientific wisdom. Unless there is an organized and politi-
cally powerful victim's advocacy group that continues to demand
research, as there was with veteran's groups demanding further study
of the health effects of Agent Orange, 20 or the women's health advo-
cacy group DES Action, which worked with researchers and legisla-
tors for increased funding for research and education about the
risks,12' the legal system's premature declarations of scientific closure
are likely to have a powerful impact on the scientific and regulatory
communities.
There are also likely to be subtle, but significant gender, race, and
class implications of the heightened requirements for proof of causa-
tion. Certain social groups have traditionally drawn greater research
interest and research dollars. For example, medical problems of mid-
dle-aged white men have received a disproportionate amount of re-
search attention, while the problems of women, the poor, and
members of minority racial and ethnic groups have received less at-
tention.122 Political groups or other organizations can also stimulate
research attention to potential health problems-for example, the un-
ions have played an important role in pushing for research into asbes-
119. See Julie M. Spanbauer, Breast Implants as Beauty Ritual: Woman's Sceptre and Prison, 9
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 157 (1997) (exploring how the legal rush to judgment has led to scientific
and media conclusions that implants are perfectly safe, falsely reassuring women and submerging
awareness and concern about well documented localized adverse effects-as distinct from sys-
temic diseases-of implants).
120. See Schuck, supra note 101, at 11-12 (discussing the continued pressure by veterans
groups on the Veterans Administration to sponsor further research and address health concerns
about Agent Orange).
121. See Finley, supra note 106, at 69.
122. See id. See also Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Fuzzy Logic of Race and Gender in the Mismeasure
of Asian American Women's Health Needs, 65 U. CN. L. REv. 799 (1997); Paul Cotton, Exam-
ples Abound of Gaps in Medical Knowledge Because of Groups Excluded From Scientific Study,
263 JAMA 1051 (1990); Paul Cotton, Is There Still Too Much Extrapolation From Data on Mid-
dle-aged White Men?, 263 JAMA 1049 (1990).
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tos and other occupational exposures; veterans groups have continued
to demand better Agent Orange and Gulf War Syndrome research. 123
Until the relatively recent attention devoted by civil rights groups to
toxic exposure issues in poor minority communities,12 4 and the activ-
ism of women's groups around breast cancer research or DES re-
search, the advocacy groups that prodded regulatory agencies or the
research community were more likely to represent largely male con-
stituencies, such as industrial workers. For these reasons, the prod-
ucts, exposures, and diseases for which there is likely to be well-
developed epidemiologic research will not be gender, race, or class-
neutral. The societal groups most likely to be under-studied by the
research community are often going to be the same groups whose
health concerns have received less initial scrutiny from product or
drug manufacturers. 2 5 If the epidemiologic community has not pro-
duced enough research into some types of the exposures and risk fac-
tors facing women, minorities, and the poor, then these groups will be
inherently disadvantaged when they try to use the tort system to re-
dress their health problems and to stimulate more serious manufac-
turer and researcher attention to their concerns. The long-standing
inequities of medical research can lead to differential race, gender,
and class-based access to the tort system.
It is not coincidental that the two products that have led courts to
devise the new heightened proof of causation rules were products
used largely by women-Bendectin, and breast implants. In both
cases, these products were over-hyped and over-used, based on very
limited or nonexistent initial manufacturer sponsored research about
safety, which is consistent with the unfortunate history of insufficient
research concern devoted to women's health issues. Their use by so
many women stemmed from culturally induced fears or pressures sur-
rounding the quintessentially female concerns of pregnancy and breast
endowment. 2 6 In light of societal health priorities, and long-standing
attitudes by manufacturers and in the medical research community to-
wards women's problems, it is unlikely that either of these products
ever would have received much scientific attention without the inter-
vention of the tort system. While the increased research attention
may have alleviated some of the initial health concerns about these
123. See Dreyfuss, supra note 101, at 2066-67.
124. See ROBERT BULLARD, UNEQUAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMU-
NITIES OF COLOR (1994).
125. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 106 (discussing how manufacturers of contraceptive devices
routinely ignored or dismissed women's reports of problems).
126. See, e.g., SUSAN M. ZIMMERMANN, SILICONE SURVIVORS: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES WITH
BREAST IMPLANTS (1998); Dresser et al., supra note 104; Spanbauer, supra note 119.
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products, it has shed important new health information on the local-
ized dangers and rupture or degradation rates of implants. Unless
courts resist the scientifically and legally problematic emerging trend
to require well-developed epidemiology in order for injured plaintiffs
to enter the courthouse gate, we may rarely have future opportunities
to learn more about new understudied but potentially ineffective or
risky products that are now being marketed, or will in the future be
marketed and used largely by, or have impacts primarily on the poor,
minorities, or women.
In order to alleviate these myriad policy pitfalls and health research
disincentives of the emerging causation law, courts faced with making
a Daubert admissibility determination about a plaintiff's proferred
causation evidence must not place all the burden of scientific uncer-
tainty on plaintiffs, especially when that uncertainty is due largely to
manufacturers' derelictions in adequately testing their products.
While courts do not yet need go so far as overtly shifting the burden of
proof on causation to manufacturers, as some have proposed, 127 they
can avoid the scientifically and statistically unsound step of elevating
epidemiology into the sole way to meet the burden of proof by per-
mitting plaintiffs to go forward based on the cumulative weight of all
available forms of scientific evidence and medical judgment, so long as
they are all types of methodologies reasonably relied on by experts in
the medical scientific disciplines. Courts must remain open to the sci-
entific reality that epidemiology with a relative risk of less than 2.0
does not rule out individual causation, and is not the only relevant
scientific or medical evidence for proving it. Courts must also care-
fully distinguish between the decision to admit evidence and the eval-
uation of that evidence for its sufficiency, or the strength and
conclusiveness of the science. If lay judges routinely start substituting
their judgments about the conclusions that may properly be based on
scientific research for the judgments of scientists, that is an overreac-
tion to concerns about litigation-driven pseudo-science corrupting the
trial process. Judges are too likely to substitute simplistic, illusory for-
mulations, such as the equation of epidemiology, with legal relevance
and the burden of proof for the careful, scientifically sensitive judg-
ment process that Daubert, sound deterrence policy, and considera-
tions of equitable access to the courts and the science stimulating
effects of tort law demand. And while much of this new judicial cau-
sation law may reflect concerns about jurors' abilities to assess com-
plex and disputed scientific evidence, jurors' judgments are often
127. See sources cited supra note 102.
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reflective of legal and community values of equal or greater impor-
tance to the value of the "right" or "certain" scientific conclusion, val-
ues such as the need to send deterrence signals to manufacturers who
have wilfully ignored their obligation to thoroughly assess the human
health risks of their drugs and products.
